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Abstract This paper presents a proposal for a suitable and viable combination of a face
recognition system and a watermarking system, namely a PCA—DCT combination, as a new
watermarked face recognition scheme that will ensure the authenticity of the data being
transmitted in the face recognition system, which will then increase its level of security. The
emphasis is on recognizing and rejecting stolen biometric data reintroduced into the system.
The research begins with an analysis of biometric systems, with an emphasis on face
recognition systems, and in particular with reference to the recorded threats on such systems,
Biometric watermarking algorithms proposed by previous researchers within the face recog-
nition environment are then studied, noting their proposed solutions to the said threats. This
would then give a good idea towards a watermarked face recognition scheme to be proposed to
enhance the security of face recognition systems, especially in terms of the authenticity of the
data being transmitted. This watermarked face recognition scheme is the main objective, which
will be then worked into the PCA—DCT combination, followed by a check on all the 8
possible locations where data may be intercepted and/or reintroduced. All the results produced
are positive, apart from a few situations that will have to be left for future work. Non
degradation of the individual PCA and DCT systems due to the combination is also checked
and experimented on, again with positive results. Finally, the robustness of the watermarked
face recognition scheme is experimented on to evaluate its resilience against attacks.
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1 Introduction
Biometrics is a relatively new domain in information security technology [18]. It determines
the identity of a person based on his/her biophysical features (e.g. face, fingerprint, palm-print,
and iris), or behavior features (e.g. signature, voice, and gaits). Various biometric systems have
been developed during the past few decades, such as automated fingerprint recognition
systems (AFRS), iris recognition systems, and face recognition systems, and they have been
successfully deployed in a wide range of applications, including access control, attendance
control, customs checking, etc. Compared with traditional token based security systems,
biometric systems are much friendlier and more difficult to cheat because biometric traits
are unique to every person and are permanent throughout his/her life.
Although biometric techniques offer reliable methods for personal identification, they do
suffer from several security problems [1, 9, 10, 26]. A study reported in [28] analyzed threats
in biometric systems and listed them out into eight classes. As an example, one kind of attack
may take place when the scanner captures the biometric traits and sends them to the feature
extraction module for further processing. At this location, the transmission channel is vulner-
able to several threats, such as eavesdropping attack, replay attack, man in the middle attack,
and brute force attack. For instance, during the raw data transmission between the said
modules, the biometric traits can be intercepted and the attackers can ‘replay’ the biometric
traits directly to the feature extractor and effectively bypass the scanner. Countermeasures to
such attacks include transmitting data over encrypted channels, the use of symmetric or
asymmetric keys, digital signatures, and Timestamp/Time to Live (TTL) tags.
Figure 1 depicts the components of a typical biometric system, where the biometrics data of
the Subject captured by a Sensor is to be matched with one of the authorized Objects stored in
a database. The core component is made up of a Feature extraction module and a Matcher that
Fig. 1 Typical components of a biometric system and possible locations for interception and reintroduction of
data
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compares the features extracted from the Subject and those from an Object. A match will result
in an Approval status sent to the Application device, else a Rejection.
Figure 1 can also be seen as the typical components of a face recognition system, where the
Sensor device is a Scanner, and the Object database is a Facial database. As mentioned, there
may be attacks on a biometric system, where data may be intercepted (stolen), manipulated,
and then reinserted (replayed) into the system to achieve Approval. Here, Fig. 1 also shows the
8 points (a,b,c,d,e,f,g,h) where biometric data may be vulnerable to attacks. At each vulnerable
point, the biometric data may be intercepted, and the intercepted (stolen) data may later be
reinserted (replayed) at the same point or at the other 7 points. Hence, 8 vulnerable points (to
intercept data from) * 8 vulnerable points (where the data may be reinserted) = 64 possible
situations. The figure also shows the possible types of data that may be intercepted and/or
reinserted. Measures to increase the level of security of biometric systems will have to secure
these 8 points, both in terms of blocking entry, as well as to ensure the authenticity of the data
being transmitted.
Indeed, in order to attain a more widespread utilization of biometric techniques, an
increased level of security of biometric data is necessary [28], in particular against interception
and replay attacks at the 8 vulnerable positions. Cryptography and watermarking are among
the possible techniques to achieve this. However, while cryptography does make transmitted
data quite unreadable against eavesdropping, it does not provide security once the data is
decrypted. On the other hand, watermarking involves embedding information into the host
data itself, so it can provide security even after decryption, as the watermark is attached to the
host data.
Recently, researchers have proposed algorithms based on image watermarking techniques
to protect biometric data [3, 8, 15, 17, 22, 27, 29, 32]. In biometric watermarking, a certain
amount of information, referred to as a watermark, is embedded into the original cover image
using a secret key, such that the contents of the cover image are not altered. Some of these
methods perform watermarking in the spatial domain [8, 17, 22, 28], while other methods
embed the biometric watermark in the frequency domain [15, 27, 29, 32].
It is in this area that this work focusses on, namely to find a suitable combination of a face
recognition system and a watermarking system, ensuring that the combination will not degrade
the performance of the individual systems, with the ultimate objective being to enhance the
level of security of the face recognition system at the 8 possible locations where data may be
intercepted and/or reintroduced, in particular in terms of the authenticity of the data being
transmitted.
2 Work on watermarking within face recognition systems
Unlike for work on watermarking in general, it has been found that only a few watermarked
biometrics schemes have been proposed specifically for protecting face images [4–6, 11, 13,
14, 20, 21, 24, 29, 31–33, 38, 39].
Tzouveli et al., [31] proposed a robust watermarking scheme with a face detection method
on real life images. The scheme detects the face region using a two dimensional Gaussian
model of skin color distribution, and then the QSWT (Qualified Significant Wavelet Trees) as
well as the DWT watermarking technique to embed the watermark in the selected area. The
experimental results showed that the efficiency of the proposed face detection algorithm and
the robustness of the watermarking scheme against various signal distortions were good.
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Unfortunately, the proposed scheme was not designed for biometric authentication systems,
but rather for protecting the face area of real life images for copyright protection. The proposed
scheme could possibly be enhanced so that it would be compatible with biometric authenti-
cation systems.
A robust biometric watermarking scheme was proposed in Vatsa et al., [32]. It was to
improve recognition accuracy and for protecting face and fingerprint images from tampering.
The Multi-resolution Discrete Wavelet Transform (DWT) watermarking technique for embed-
ding a face image into a fingerprint image was used. The quality of the extracted face image is
enhanced using a Support Vector Machine (SVM) algorithm by selecting the best quality
pixels from two extracted face images. Experimental results showed that the fingerprint
verification accuracy is maintained at a high level even under attacks. As for the extracted
face images, the SVM improved by at least 10 % for verification accuracy.
Chen and Chang [6] proposed a watermarking system for personal image copyright
protection by embedding the owner’s eigenvalue information as a bar code image into different
positions based on a SHA-1 sequence. Experiments showed that the imperceptibility value and
the watermark detection rate are over the acceptable benchmark. Even though the proposed
scheme indeed protects the cover image, again the scheme was not designed for nor
experimented on biometric image authentication.
Another interesting approach is found in Salahi et al., [29] where a CT (Contourlet
Transform) watermarking technique is used for securing face recognition systems. First, the
face image is transformed in the CT domain at three levels, and then the smallest variance is
selected for watermark embedding. A logo which is generated using a Walsh code is used as
the hidden message. Experiments were conducted to calculate the performance of the face
recognition system with and without watermarking under several attacks. The results show that
the proposed scheme is robust against various attacks with the performance of the face
recognition being hardly affected due to the watermark embedding. However, other face
recognition algorithms were not tried with the CT domain watermarking technique to inves-
tigate their performance. This is a robust watermarking technique to cater for ownership
authentication, but the embedding does not cover the entire face image, nor is there a check
for the most appropriate places for embedding. Furthermore, it is also possible that the
recognition rate is not affected because the watermark is embedded in a place from where
the face features are not extracted for authentication. The image processing attacks used to
investigate the robustness of the proposed scheme were also apparently not very strong, as the
attacks did not deeply ruin the face image.
Most image watermarking is performed using DWT. However, one of the major drawbacks
of DWT is that the transformation does not provide for shift invariance because of the down-
sampling of its bands. To address the problems of DWT based watermarking, Yan and Liu [38]
presented a 3-level RDWT (Redundant Discrete Wavelet Transform) biometric watermarking
scheme. The proposed scheme first computes the embedding capacity of a face image by using
an edge and corner phase congruency method. RDWT decomposes a face image into four sub-
bands such that the size of each sub-band is equal to the original image. The redundant space
in RDWT provides for additional locations for embedding, and the watermarking scheme can
be designed as such that the exact location for watermark embedding can be determined. Since
the size of each RDWT sub-band is equal to the size of the input image, the three levels of the
RDWT decomposition provide adequate capacity to embed the watermark data without
affecting the edge and corner locations. Only the second and third levels of the RDWT are
used for embedding because these two levels provide more resilience to geometric and
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frequency attacks. Extraction is simply the reverse of the embedding process. Experimental
results show that the scheme is resilient to many different signal processing attacks.
A fragile watermarking scheme was proposed in Zhang [39] that focuses on the facial
image database in a face recognition system. The main objective is to protect the face images
against tampering attacks by detecting the locations of any modifications. Experiments were
conducted on the impact on recognition accuracy, detection rate, as well as the speed of face
recognition with and without the watermark. The results from the experiments indicated that
the scheme has a high recognition rate, sustains a good imperceptibility level of face images, as
well as a high sensitivity level against tempering the watermarked facial images.
Li et al., [20] proposed a novel salient region based authentication watermarking scheme to
protect biometric templates by embedding the watermark in the region of background (ROB)
and the region of salient (ROI) to investigate the face recognition rate. Experimental results
showed that the proposed scheme is able to detect any interfered area, and recover the original
biometric features while maintaining the recognition rate. They also proposed a semi fragile
biometric watermarking to protect a face image from tampering. It was shown that the
recognition rate is very minimally affected due to the watermark embedding.
Behera and Govindan [5] proposed a multimodal biometric watermarking techniques using
DCTand Phase Congruency model for personal identification system such as e-passport and e-
identification cards. The authors protect the face image by embedded the demographic data
and fingerprint information of the same person as watermark. The authors claimed their
proposed technique have achieved significance improvement on quality, complexity and
accuracy of recognition rate. However, from analyzing the author’s results, the recognition
rate of the watermarked image is not investigated.
In 2012, Isa and Aljareh [13] proposed a watermarked face recognition scheme based on a
DCT watermarking technique using the COX algorithm. According to Isa and Aljareh, the
embedded watermark did not degrade the face recognition rate of the PCA algorithm. The
proposed scheme is applied to face images where the password of a given person is hidden in
the corresponding image to authenticate him. In their latest work, Isa et al., [14] proposed a
blind robust watermarked face recognition scheme based on the combination of PCA as the
face recognition algorithm, with the DCT watermarking technique to enhance the security of
the face recognition system without degrading the recognition rate. The authors analyzed, in
particular, the 8 vulnerable positions where data could be intercepted and/or resubmitted Ratha
et al., [28], and the experiment set up is generally discussed in the paper.
Inamdar and Rege [12] proposed a dual watermarking scheme for biometric data as
copyright protection, where multiple biometric watermarks (speech and face biometric traits)
of the owner are embedded as well as an offline signature being delicately overlaid on the
cover image. Before embedding, speech is compressed using Linear Predictive Coding (LPC)
and a Gabor face is created from the face biometric traits. All three watermarks, Gabor face,
LPC coefficients, and offline signature are the biometric characteristics of the owner and hence
they are highly related to the copyright holder. The proposed scheme is robust because as the
multiple watermarks are embedded in different areas of the image, at least one watermark will
survive under watermarking attacks.
Amongst the latest research paper was from Kekre et al., [19]. They have proposed a
biometric watermarking using partial DCT-walsh wavelet and SVD (Singular Value Decom-
position). A face image is selected as a cover image while iris image as the embedded
watermark. They claimed the proposed technique is highly robust against compression,
selective and random cropping, noise addition and resizing attack. However, the proposed
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technique does not perform well under selective cropping attack, but can be protected if the
embedded watermark were to be on the middle frequency coefficients (instead of low
frequency) of the cover image. If this is the case, the authors should also re-evaluate the other
attacks if the watermark were to be embedded in the middle frequency.
From a rather thorough literature survey, it is found that previous research tends to protect
the face image against certain threats on biometric authentication systems only in general,
rather than trying to recognize and reject attempts to attack at specific points in the system.
There is indeed a need for a watermarked face recognition scheme that would able to cover the
eight positions described earlier against intentional attack, as given by Ratha et al., [28]. This is
precisely the focus of this research. From a rather extensive literature survey related to the 8
vulnerable points given in Fig. 1, it is found that most researchers focus on the protecting
biometric data at certain positions only, mainly at position a (scanner) and position g (storage).
We also found that many proposed schemes focus on maintaining the quality of the face
image, whereas in a face recognition system, the quality of the face image is not important as
long as the feature extraction module is able to extract the features from the face image for
authentication (this has an impact on the robustness of the watermark against tampering). In
our research, we focus on efforts towards ensuring the full security at all 8 vulnerable points,
although some may not be relevant and some may have to be left for future work.
3 Methodology
The research begins with an analysis of biometric systems, with an emphasis on face
recognition systems, and in particular with reference to the eight threats that have been listed
out by [28]. Next, biometric watermarking algorithms proposed by previous researchers within
the face recognition environment are studied and classified according to their proposed
solutions to the said threats.
The above would then give a very good idea towards proposing a watermarked face
recognition scheme to enhance the security of face recognition systems, especially in terms
of the authenticity of the data being transmitted. This watermarked face recognition scheme is
the main objective.
For an implementation to validate the proposed watermarked face recognition scheme,
the Principal Component Analysis (PCA) method, the most popular holistic approach for
face recognition, is singled out with the reasons backing the choice. For the watermarking
approach, the Least Significant Bits (LSB), Discrete Cosine Transform (DCT), and
Discrete Wavelet Transform (DWT) techniques, being representative of their respective
approaches, are looked at to complement the PCA to increase its level of security. An
analysis shows that the DCT would probably perform the best, and a further analysis is
carried out to ensure that the PCA—DCT combination will not degrade the performance
of the individual systems.
The proposed watermarked face recognition scheme is then worked into the PCA—DCT
combination, followed by a check on the 8 possible locations (of Fig. 1) where data may be
intercepted and/or reintroduced to ensure the authenticity of the data being transmitted. Within
the 64 (8 × 8) possible situations, some may not be relevant, many will be shown to be
resolved (fully-protected), while the (few) remaining ones will have to be left for future work.
This methodology covers and achieved the main objectives of this research as mentioned in
the Introduction, with the ultimate goal being to enhance the level of security of the face
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recognition system at the 8 possible locations where data may be intercepted and/or
reintroduced, in particular in terms of the authenticity of the data being transmitted:
& To find a suitable combination of a face recognition system and a watermarking system,
& To propose the appropriate watermarked face recognition scheme,
& Ensuring that the combination does not degrade the performance of the individual systems.
The rest of the paper will cover the findings in the following manner:
& Proposing the watermarked face recognition scheme to protect the face image from 8
vulnerable positions for system rejection of stolen data (in section 4)
& Using a PCA—DCT combination, ensuring that the combination will not degrade the
performance of the individual systems (in section 5)
& Experimentation for (in section 6):
– Validation of system rejection of stolen data
– Validation of non-degradation of PCA and DCT due to the combination
– Determining the frequency band for watermarking (a necessity)
– Robustness of the watermark scheme (a necessity)
– Validation for the choice of PCA—DCTcombination: comparative study of watermarking
techniques
The underlying idea here is to show that the PCA-DCT combination does not degrade the
performance of the individual systems, and that the proposed watermarked face recognition
scheme will ensure the authenticity of the data being transmitted in the face recognition system
at the 8 vulnerable positions where data may be intercepted and/or reinserted. The
watermarking scheme also needs to be shown to be robust against signal processing attacks,
and in particular the watermark cannot be easily removed by an attacker.
4 The proposed watermarked face recognition scheme
In a generic face recognition system, there are three main processes – face detection, face
extraction and face recognition (respectively points a, c and e in Fig. 1). The input of a face
recognition is always an image and the output is an identification or verification of the person
appearing in the image. A face is detected and extracted from the scene, then followed by the
feature extraction step by obtaining the relevant facial features from the data. A similar feature
extraction approach (point f) works on the targeted object (from point g) - the target object is
determined by some means, perhaps by tagging a smart card carrying the identity of the
subject. Finally, the system recognizes (at point e) the face using template matching strategies
whereby the algorithms compare input images with stored patterns of faces or features,
resulting with an approval if there is a match, and a rejection otherwise. The pattern database
is learnt from a set of training images.
Watermarking techniques are usually proposed to add ownership information and/or
camouflage copyright marks of multimedia objects and information in digital images, audio
and video. When face recognition is combined with watermarking techniques, watermarks are
usually inserted and embedded into the image of the subject as soon as it is captured (at point
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a), and additional watermarks may be embedded in the object image once retrieved from the
database (at point g) to make it the same as for the subject. This is then followed by the feature
extraction process on both sides (at points c and f), resulting in their respective feature files, on
which the matching algorithm will work. In essence, this matching is exactly like the matching
on the features of the original images, except that these features have been (in a sense)
transformed to include the watermarks (albeit not done directly).
The main thing to note here is that the matching should give exactly the same results
(approval or rejection) as with the original face recognition process, because:
& Exactly the same watermarks are inserted into both the subject and object images
& Exactly the same face recognition algorithm is used
– The same original face recognition feature extraction algorithm is used on both ends
– The same original face recognition feature matching algorithm is used.
Now, it remains to see how the proposed watermarked face recognition scheme will enhance
security. The proposedwatermarked face recognition schememakes use of 2 different watermarks:
& Logo
& Timestamp
The logo serves as in any other watermarking technique that inserts particular images
within object images. The main purpose is usually to identify genuine images within the
database of objects. However, in this proposed work, it will be seen further on that it is also
used to identify stolen images.
The timestamp is the main security enhancer, as it will be used as a form of session ID. Any
image stolen from within the process and reinserted later will be immediately recognized as
coming from a different session and will be rejected. In addition, like the logo, it can also be
used to identify stolen images by its mere existence within the image.
In order to check on the coverage of proposed watermarked face recognition scheme, Fig. 2
depicts the proposed scheme indicating the places where the watermarks are present within the
system, and most importantly the positions where attackers can steal biometric data from
within the system and then reinsert it at the same or at other positions.
Fig. 2 The proposed watermarked face recognition scheme
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The diagram indicates that data may be stolen from any of the 8 points a, b, c. d, e, f, g, h,
and then reinserted at the same place or at any other point, which gives rise to 8 × 8 = 64
situations. We will look at all these further below. First, two key points about this watermarked
face recognition scheme proposed work are to be noted:
& It covers only situations where data is stolen from the system, and NOTwhen fresh data is
introduced.
& It also covers only situations where the watermark has been introduced (hence not at point a).
The above means that the following two situations are excluded, and may be left for future
work – presenting a printed image to the scanner (at point a), and when the approval code is
stolen at point h and reused by reinsertion later on at the same point.
It is also to be noted that in as much as data may be stolen from any of the 7 remaining
points (other than a), there is nothing to gain by reinserting the stolen data at points e, f and g,
as these points transmit or store authenticating data and not the one to be authenticated. This
then reduces the total number of situations to be checked from 8 × 8 = 64 down to 7 × 4 = 28.
Within these 28 situations, observe that data stolen from the following points will have the
given contents (recall that points a and h are outside the scope) as shown in Tables 1 and 2:
This above means that only the following combinations of stolen→reinsertions are possible:
Thus two fundamental points underlie this technique:
& Any image stolen from anywhere other than from point a will already have a watermark
inserted (at least a logo), and its presence can be readily detected. The image can then be
immediately rejected if it is reinserted at point a.
& Data stolen from one point may have to be processed externally before reinserting at
another point. For example, for an image stolen from point a, to be reinserted at points c or
d will have to have its features extracted before being reinserted. However, apart from
points a and g, all data would have the timestamp watermark, and so a later reinsertion (as
a subject) will not tally with the timestamp of the object watermark.
From the above, one should then be able to deduce that the system should be able to reject
data stolen from and reinserted at according the following Table 3:
5 PCA—DCT combination system
In this study, only one face recognition algorithm is selected to combine with one of three
watermarking techniques. Although this may seem quite limited, the algorithm and techniques
Table 1 The contents of stolen data from point b to point g
b c d e f g
Subject Subject Subject & Object Object Object Object
Image Features Features Features Image Image
Logo Logo Logo Logo Logo Logo
Timestamp Timestamp Timestamp Timestamp Timestamp Not Applicable
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chosen are considered representative of their respective approaches (being the most cited and
considered the best), and it would at least set a new benchmark and reference for other
implementations to follow.
PCA is one of the most used algorithms and has proven to be very effective for information
compression in face recognition systems. Furthermore, researchers have shown that PCA
performs well in recognition when the training data set is small (which is the case in this
research), and is very stable with different training sets [16]. Furthermore, according to [25],
the DCT approach is very robust to JPEG compression since JPEG itself makes use of DCT.
Having assured that data stolen from and reinserted at the relevant points would be rejected
(7 × 4 = 28 situations), next is to check that the PCA and DCT will not disturb each other’s
performance, especially in terms of accuracy. The choice of PCA—DCT combination is
validated via experimentation reported in 6.6.
On this point, analytical results validated by experiments as presented by [36] have shown
that when DCT is first applied on a pixel file to obtain a frequency domain file (with changes
in coefficients), and then followed by the application of PCA for compression as well as
reconverting to an image (compressed file), the result is the same as that of a direct application
of PCA on the original pixel file. This is as illustrated in Fig. 3 – path 1.
This result would mean that it is safe to say that DCT does not degrade the accuracy
performance of PCA algorithm, at least in terms of the accuracy of face recognition, should
there be a need to introduce watermarking at certain points of the face recognition system.
Ideally, we would want to have the same analytical results both ways, namely also for the
application of DCT following an application of PCA – path 2 in Fig. 3 – which would then
show that PCA also does not degrade the accuracy of DCT. Proving this result is beyond the
scope of this work, and so experiments are conducted to show some form of validation of this
result, which is reported in 6.3.
6 Experimentation
There are two important factors in building the watermarked face image. Firstly and most
importantly, the face recognition rate is maintained with the embedded watermark as a security
Table 2 The positions from which
data may be stolen from and the
possible reinsertion positions with
the required contents
Stolen at Reinsertion at Contents
b, f, g a Requires image
b, f, g b Requires image
c, d, e c Requires features
c, d, e d Requires features
Table 3 System rejection of stolen data
Rejection by Stolen at Reinsertion at Rejection at
Illegitimate presence of logo b, f, g a a
Timestamp does not tally b, f, g b b
Value of features do not match (by the face recognition system) c, d, e c, d d
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mechanism. Secondly, the watermark detection rate should be high without affecting the
recognition rate. Both these factors go hand in hand. Previous researchers tend to put an
emphasis on the perceptibility of the face image, whereas in reality, biometric authentication
systems do not really need a clear face image as long as face features can be extracted
successfully for authentication. The printed image is never shown to anyone.
Five experiments are conducted to validate the claims made in this paper, which all proved
successful:
1) Security – system rejection of stolen data
– Illegitimate presence of watermarks (logo)
– Timestamp does not tally
– Value of features do not match (based on the face recognition system)
2) Non degradation accuracy performance of PCA and DCT due to the combination
3) Determining the frequency band for watermarking
4) Robustness of the proposed watermarked face recognition scheme.
5) Comparative study of watermarking techniques
All the experiments are conducted using the Our Database of Faces [23] at AT&T
Laboratories, Cambridge University. The database contains a set of face images of 40 persons
with ten different images for each person. The images were taken at different times, with
various lighting conditions, different facial expressions (open /closed eyes, open/closed mouth,
smiling/unsmiling etc.) and dissimilar facial details (glasses/ no glasses). All the images were
taken against a dark homogeneous background with the subjects in an upright and frontal
position. The size of each image is 92 × 112 pixels with 256 grey levels per pixel in PGM
format.
Recall that one of the main purposes of our proposed scheme is for countering replay
attacks with a robust blind watermarked face recognition scheme to protect the biometric traits
from being re-used (replayed) by attackers. The face image can be protected against such an
attack by placing the watermark in the area where the face feature extraction happens. As such,
the proposed scheme should meet the following goals:
& Reject face images that have been stolen and re-inserted later at any point within the face
recognition system.
Fig. 3 DCT and PCA do not degrade each other accuracy
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& Retain the recognition rate for watermarked face images to maintain the effectiveness of
the face recognition system.
In the proposed watermarked face recognition scheme, the Viola & Jones algorithm [34] is
adopted for the face detection algorithm, and the PCA for the feature extraction technique. The
Viola & Jones algorithm is very effective for the localization of the spatial extent of the face
and to determine its boundaries. The algorithm was observed to perform reasonably well on
the face images used in this work. PCA has been chosen as the feature extraction algorithm
because PCA has proven to be very effective for information compression, and several
researchers have also shown that PCA performs better in face recognition when the training
data set is small, which is our case.
6.1 General modules
The five experiments will be presented in turn further below, but first we present the two most
critical modules utilized in the system – the watermark embedding module and the watermark
extraction module.
6.1.1 Watermark embedding module
The overall watermark embedding process is illustrated in Fig. 4, and the details of the steps
are as follows.
Step 1. Read the face image and the watermark image.
Step 2. Transform the watermark image into binary and convert the binary watermark
sequence into an Arnold Transform (AT). The AT [37] is used in order to protect
the watermark against intentional reconstruction by intruders.
Step 3. Detect the face area using the Viola Jones technique.
Fig. 4 Watermark embedding process
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Step 4. Divide the face area image into 8 × 8 blocks, and convert each block into a DCT
transform.
Step 5. Protect against compression. In order to protect the watermark against JPEG
compression, each DCT coefficient from every block is quantized using the quan-
tization table of the JPEG compression standards. (Refer to Fig. 5 below).
Step 6. Choose the frequency band for watermark embedding to be done in Step 7. [This
frequency band is decided based on Experiment 3 – see below].
Step 7. Choose the robustness level for watermark embedding [This watermark strength value
is decided based on Experiment 4.] Then execute watermark embedding. For this, let
C(k,l) be the DCT coefficients in the chosen frequency range, R the modulus, P the
mathematical remainder of |C(k,l)| with P∈ 0; 1; 2;…:; R 1f g, and the other vari-
ables be declared via the formulae as given below. The value of R is a predefined
constant and is used as a reference threshold. The higher the value of R, the higher the
level of robustness of the method, but the quality of the watermarked image decreases.
The value of R is chosen in such a way so as to obtain a balance between robustness
and the face recognition rate, which apparently also depends on image quality.
P ¼ C k; lð Þj j mod R ;
if watermark bit ¼ 0 : if watermark bit ¼ 1 :
if P ≥ 3  R
4 if P≪
R
4
C k; lð Þ* ¼ C k; lð Þ−P þ 5* R
4
C k; lð Þ* ¼ C k; lð Þ−P − R
4
else if P < 3*
R
4
&& P≥2*
P
4
else if P >
R
4
&& P ≪ 2 *
R
4
C k; lð Þ* ¼ C k; lð Þ−P þ R
4
C k; lð Þ* ¼ C k; lð Þ−P þ 3* R
4
else else
C k; lð Þ* ¼ C k; lð Þ C k; lð Þ* ¼ C k; lð Þ
ð1Þ
Step 8. Repeat steps 6 and 7 until the entire watermark is successfully embedded into the
remaining blocks. Apply inverse DCT to each block to construct the watermarked
face image.
6.1.2 Watermark extraction module
The overall watermark extraction process is illustrated in Fig. 6, and the details of the steps are
given after that.
16 11 10 16 24 40 51 61 
12 12 14 19 26 58 60 55 
14 13 16 24 40 57 69 56 
14 17 22 29 51 87 80 62 
18 22 37 56 68 109 103 77 
24 35 55 64 81 104 113 92 
49 64 78 87 103 121 120 101 
72 92 95 98 112 100 103 99 
Fig. 5 Quantization table
recommended in the JPEG
specification
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The watermark extraction steps are very closely related to the watermark embedding steps.
In essence, the watermark can be extracted by reversing the embedding steps provided the
location of the embedded watermark is known. As the scheme is based on blind watermarking
concepts, the original image is not needed as a reference. There are two variables needed for
extraction: the locations of the watermark bits and the value of the modulus R. The extracted
bits are assembled to obtain the watermark pattern and then the inverse Arnold transformation
is applied.
Step 1. Detect the face area of the watermarked face image.
Step 2. Divide the watermarked image into 8 × 8 blocks and convert each block into the
DCT frequency domain.
Step 3. Extract the watermark bits using the equation below and the embedded watermark
location. Let C(k,l)* be the DCT chosen frequency coefficients of the embedded
watermark, eb the extracted watermark bit, and R the modulus.
eb ¼
0; if C k; lð Þ mod Rð Þ < R
2
1; if C k; lð Þ mod Rð Þ≥ R
2
8><>: ð2Þ
Step 4. Repeat steps 2 and 3 on each block until all watermark bits have been extracted and
concatenated into a watermark pattern.
Step 5. Inverse the watermark pattern with the Arnold transformation.
Step 6. Reconstruct the watermark pattern to obtain the extracted watermark.
Fig. 6 Watermark extraction process
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The watermark embedding and extraction processes are used at runtime as well as in all the
five experiments, which we are now in a position to present.
6.2 Experiment 1 - system rejection
The experiment was to test for rejection in the following situations, using the images of 10
individuals:
a) Rejection 1 - Illegitimate presence of logo (at point a)
Rejection at point a is based on the presence of a logo within the submitted image.
b) Rejection 2 - Timestamp does not tally (at point b)
Rejection at point b is based on the value of the timestamp not within the acceptable
range of the current time.
c) Rejection 3 - Feature values do not match (at point d)
Rejection at point d is done by the face recognition Matcher, also based on the features
converted from the timestamp in the submitted image which do not match with the
features converted from the timestamp converted from the image coming from the object
database. All were successfully rejected by the system (30 situations).
d) Additional - Logo does not exist (at points a, g)
Although mentioned in section 4 as not being within the scope of this research (7 × 4 =
28 situations), experiments were also conducted for a particular situation at point a and
one for point g. Rejection at point a is based on the existence of a logo, while rejection at
point g is when the logo does not exist.
In the above, all were successfully rejected by the system – 30 situations each for (a), (b),
(c), and 20 for (d). These results thus fully validate the claims.
6.3 Experiment 2 - non-degradation
This experiment is to validate the claim that the use of DCT will not degrade PCA-based face
recognition, and vice versa.
Figure 7 below illustrates the analytical result validated by experiments as presented by
Weilong Chen, Meng Joo Er, and Shiqian Wu [36] is shown as path 1. That experiment is
repeated here. The other part of the experiment is the application of DCT following an
application of PCA, i.e. path 2, in an effort to show that PCA also does not degrade the
accuracy of DCT.
Fig. 7 Experiment 2 – DCT and PCA do not degrade accuracy of each other
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The experiment is carried out for both paths with the same input images, with a hope to
show that the results are identical with the input images. Should this be the case, given that
PCA has been shown not to degrade DCT (Path 1), identical results from Path 2 would indicate
that DCT also does not degrade PCA.
Recall that both paths result in essentially compressed coefficient files. For path 1, the DCT
produces frequencies, which are then compressed by the DCT (Compressed Frequency 1). For
path 2, the PCA compresses the image file, and the DCT produces the frequencies of the
compressed file (Compressed Frequency 2). These two files at face value are quite different,
but equality may be shown by reconverting the files resulting from both paths into pixel files
and then both are compared to the respective original input images. For the comparison, the
structural similarity (SSIM) index is used, and recall that the closer the value is to 1, the closer
are the compared images.
The SSIM index is based on the concept of full reference image quality assessment in Wang
et al., [35]. The SSIM index is calculated for various types of images, such as to check on the
preservation of the quality of digital television and cinematic pictures, as well as for digital
images and videos in general. The SSIM index is calculated on the various windows of an
image. The measure is between two windows of common size N×N from two given images x
and y where the SSIM index compares local patterns of pixel intensities that have been
normalized for luminance, contrast and structure, and it is defined as follows:
SSIM x; yð Þ ¼
2μxμy þ C1
 
2σxy þ C2
 
μ2x þ μ2y þ C1
 
σ2x þ σ2y þ C2
  ð3Þ
where μx and μy are respectively the means of the signals for x and y, σx and σy are the standard
deviations of the signals for x and y, while C1 and C2 are constants with values much smaller
than 1. σxy is the estimated correlation coefficient of the signals for x and y. A SSIM(x, y) value
of 1 would mean the images x and y are completely identical, but for this experiment, a
threshold value of 0.85 would already suffice.
The experiment is conducted with a set of face images of 40 different persons. The
experiment first validates path 1, by showing that the output pixel files are identical to the
input images, i.e. with an SSIM index of 1. This is then followed by comparing the results of
path 2 with the input images, with the hope of similar results.
For PCA in the experiment, 20 principal components are used. In path 1, the face image is
first converted into the frequency domain using DCT, after which the DCT coefficients are
compressed using PCA. The compressed DCT coefficients are then reconstructed back into a
pixel file using the Inverse DCT (IDCT) technique [7]. As for path 2, the face image is first
compressed using PCA, after which the compressed face image is then converted into the DCT
frequency domain and then reconstructed back into a pixel file using IDCT.
The SSIM index measurements for the similarity values between the original face images
and the output pixel files for path 1 and path 2 are as given in the Table 4 below.
The results above show that for path 1 the compressed face images are exactly similar
(identical) to the respective original face images, as stipulated by Weilong Chen, Meng Joo Er,
Shiqian Wu [36]. As for path 2, the compressed face images have different SSIM values, but
are all very close to 1. This shows that there is some disturbance in the quality compared with
the original face images. The SSIM threshold value of 0.85 is considered acceptable, which is
the case here. [Note: Admittedly, this threshold value of 0.85 is essentially a conjecture.
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Table 4 The SSIM index mea-
surements for Path 1 and Path 2 SSIM
Face images Path 1 Path 2
Person 1 1 0.9216
Person 2 1 0.8692
Person 3 1 0.9543
Person 4 1 0.8950
Person 5 1 0.9387
Person 6 1 0.8938
Person 7 1 0.8936
Person 8 1 0.9518
Person 9 1 0.9290
Person 10 1 0.9216
Person 11 1 0.8798
Person 12 1 0.9402
Person 13 1 0.9089
Person 14 1 0.8717
Person 15 1 0.8670
Person 16 1 0.8730
Person 17 1 0.9053
Person 18 1 0.9111
Person 19 1 0.9320
Person 20 1 0.9006
Person 21 1 0.9287
Person 22 1 0.8929
Person 23 1 0.9383
Person 24 1 0.9016
Person 25 1 0.9295
Person 26 1 0.9311
Person 27 1 0.8818
Person 28 1 0.9044
Person 29 1 0.9307
Person 30 1 0.9221
Person 31 1 0.9113
Person 32 1 0.8732
Person 33 1 0.9223
Person 34 1 0.8687
Person 35 1 0.9397
Person 36 1 0.8658
Person 37 1 0.8655
Person 38 1 0.9131
Person 39 1 0.9420
Person 40 1 0.9107
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Further experiments will have to be conducted to ascertain the correct threshold value
(comparable to the universally accepted watermark detection rate of 0.75 – see Experiment
3 below). This will be left for future work.]
6.4 Experiment 3 - determining the frequency band for watermarking
This experiment is to determine the best frequency band to place the watermarks in an image,
with the highest level of accuracy for face recognition, as well as the highest level of accuracy
for watermark detection and recognition.
The experiment is conducted with a set of face images of 40 persons, with ten different
facial expressions for each person. As such, 400 face images are used in this experiment for
each frequency band. The detailed steps are as follows:
i. Every face image is embedded with the watermark in the low frequency band area.
ii. The watermarked face images are tested in the system to measure the face recognition
accuracy rate as well as the watermark detection rate.
iii. The strength value of the watermark is increased slowly to find out at which level the
accuracy and detection rate begins to deteriorate.
iv. Repeat step i with the middle and high frequency band areas.
6.4.1 Accuracy - maintaining the accuracy of face recognition with high watermark
strengths
It is essential to investigate which frequency band has the least effect on the face
recognition rate due to the embedded watermark. The results show that, as the
strength value of the watermark increases, the face recognition rate for the middle
frequency bands starts to decrease first, followed by the low bands and finally the
high bands.
Figure 8 below shows the performance for the face recognition rate for each DCT
frequency band. The underlying idea is to select the maximum strength value for the
watermark where the face recognition still has 100 % accuracy for feature extraction. Referring
to Fig. 8, the recognition rate begins to decrease around the strength value of 4200. Therefore,
it can be summarized that the high frequency band is the best location to maximise the
watermark strength while maintaining the face recognition rate.
Figure 9 shows the quality of the face image after embedding the watermark with different
watermark strengths. It can be seen that at a very high watermark strength of 4200, where the
recognition rate is still maintained at 100 %, perceptibility is still quite high even with the
naked eye.
6.4.2 Detection - existence of watermark for acceptance or rejection
At the same time, it is also crucial to look at the watermark detection rate on each
frequency band to balance with the face recognition rate. The proposed scheme not
only needs to have a high face recognition rate but also a high watermark detection
rate, with or without intruder attacks. The detection rate is measured using the
Normalized Correlation (NC) score.
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The previous experiment (a) showed that a 100 % face recognition rate can still be
maintained up to a certain watermark strength value for each frequency band. This experiment
looks at the watermark detection rates up to those specific values. From the results (see
Table 5), it can be concluded that the watermark detection rate can be maintained at a high
level on the low frequency band as the watermark strength value increases. In general, it is
universally recognized that a watermark detection rate of over the threshold value of 0.75 is
considered acceptable, as at such rates the watermark can still be fully recovered [2].
From the first experiment (a), it is found that the face recognition rate performs better in the
high frequency band, whereas the second experiment shows that the low frequency band
outperform the higher band on the watermark detection rate. The comparisons for face
recognition and watermark detection rates for each frequency band are then compiled in
Figs. 10, 11, and 12 in order to help determine which frequency band should be finally
selected for watermark embedding.
From the figures above, it can be seen that all watermark detection rates are above the
threshold value of 0.75 in all frequency bands. However, both face recognition and watermark
detection rates are mostly maintained at high levels in the low frequency bands. This then leads
to the conclusion that the low frequency bands are the most suitable for watermark embedding.
The watermark strength value for the last point of the highest recognition rate (100 %) in
the low frequency bands is then selected for the evaluation of the robustness value of the
proposed scheme – which turns out to be 3900.
Strength 
Value 
(Modulus) 300 900 1500 2100 2700 3000 3300 3600 3900 4200 4500
Low 
Frequency 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 99.48 98.70
Middle 
Frequency 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 99.74 99.74 98.96 98.70
High 
Frequency 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 99.74
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Fig. 8 Face recognition accuracy rate comparison with each DCT frequency band under different strength value
SV = 3300 SV = 3600 SV = 3900 SV = 4200 
Fig. 9 The quality of the face image for different watermark strength values
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Table 5 Detection rate for different frequency band
Detection rate (NC)
Watermark strength (R) Low Freq. Middle Freq. High Freq.
300 1 1 1
600 1 1 1
900 1 1 1
1200 1 1 0.99
1500 1 0.99 0.98
1800 0.99 0.98 0.97
2100 0.99 0.97 0.96
2400 0.98 0.96 0.95
2700 0.97 0.94 0.94
3000 0.97 0.93 0.94
3300 0.97 0.92 0.94
3600 0.97 0.91 0.94
3900 0.97 0.91 0.94
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Fig. 10 Comparison of face
recognition and watermark
detection rates for watermarks
embedded in the low frequency
bands
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Fig. 11 Comparison of face
recognition and watermark
detection rates for watermarks
embedded in the middle frequency
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6.5 Experiment 4 - robustness
This experiment is to determine the level of robustness of the watermark scheme. The
robustness of the watermark scheme needs to be investigated to ensure that the watermark
cannot be easily removed by an attacker.
From the results of Experiment 3, the lower frequency bands are chosen for watermark
embedding, and the selected strength value for the watermark is 3900. For these chosen
frequency bands and the watermark strength, this experiment is conducted with the same 400
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Fig. 12 Comparison of face
recognition and watermark
detection rates for watermarks
embedded in the high frequency
bands
Table 6 Detection rate after
attacks Attack type Detection rate
(NC)
Median Filter (3 × 3) 0.935682
Median Filter (5 × 5) 0.927467
Median Filter (7 × 7) 0.857539
Median Filter (9 × 9) 0.694807
Median Filter (15 × 15) 0.629405
Gaussian Noise (0,0.01) 0.907509
Gaussian Noise (0,0.05) 0.891861
Gaussian Noise (0,0.1) 0.886505
Gaussian Noise (0.01,0) 0.967328
Gaussian Noise (0.02,0) 0.968085
Gaussian Noise (0.1,0) 0.973004
Gaussian Noise (0.05,0) 0.970751
Salt&Pepper (0.001) 0.963221
Salt&Pepper (0.002) 0.960227
Salt&Pepper (0.01) 0.940843
Salt&Pepper (0.05) 0.904951
Salt&Pepper (0.1) 0.893861
JPEG compression (10 %) 0.807241
JPEG compression (30 %) 0.883940
JPEG compression (50 %) 0.914256
JPEG compression (70 %) 0.938168
JPEG compression (90 %) 0.959181
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watermarked face images used for Experiment 3. Each watermarked face image is disturbed
with various signal processing attacks (median filter, Gaussian noise, salt & pepper, JPEG
compression), after which the watermark is extracted to evaluate the quality preservation
performance. The extracted watermark is compared with the original watermark, also using
the Normalized Correlation (NC) score.
Table 6 gives the experiment results for robustness. It can be seen that the proposed scheme
is resilient especially against JPEG compression, Gaussian noise, as well as salt and pepper
attacks, where the embedded watermark is hardly disturbed from such attacks. As for the
median filter attack, the proposed scheme is able to survive up to 7 × 7 filters, which indicates
that it is fairly robust.
As illustrated in Fig. 13 below, it can also be seen by the naked eye that the embedded
watermark can still be clearly seen after a large number image processing attacks.
6.6 Experiment 5 - comparative study of watermarking techniques
This experiment is to validate the choice of DCT as the watermarking technique to be coupled
with DCT, by comparing it with two other most used watermarking techniques – namely LSB
(spatial) and DWT (transform/frequency).
As with most of the earlier experiments, this experiment is also conducted with face images
of 40 persons, each with ten different facial expressions, giving a total of 400 different images.
The images are embedded using the three said watermark techniques. The same earlier
JPEG Comp. 10 JPEG Comp. 30 JPEG Comp. 50 JPEG Comp. (70) JPEG Comp. (90)
Median (3x3) Median (5x5) Median (7x7) Median (9x9) Median (15x15)
Salt&Pepper (0.1) Salt&Pepper 
(0.05)
Salt&Pepper 
(0.01)
Salt&Pepper 
(0.002)
Salt&Pepper 
(0.001)
Gaussian (0, 0.01) Gaussian (0,0.05) Gaussian (0, 0.1) Gaussian (0.01, 0) Gaussian (0.02,0)
Gaussian (0.1,0) Gaussian (0.05,0)
Fig. 13 Quality of watermark image after several attacks
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accuracy measurements for face recognition, watermark detection, and watermark robustness
are used for this experiment. The measures are to see how much degradation would the
watermark technique affect the PCA recognition rate in the three mod combinations/models:
– Model 1: PCA-LSB
– Model 2: PCA-DCT (our choice)
– Model 1: PCA-DWT
No Attack Median 3x3 Median 5x5 
Gaussian 
(0,0.002) 
Gaussian 
(0,0.001) 
Gaussian 
(0.005,0) 
Gaussian 
(0.05,0) 
Gaussian 
(0.001,0) 
Gaussian 
(0.01,0) 
Salt&Pepper 
(0.005) 
Salt&Pepper 
(0.002) 
Salt&Pepper 
(0.001) 
Salt&Pepper 
(0.01) 
Jpegcomp 
(10) 
Jpegcomp 
(30) 
Jpegcomp 
(50) 
Jpegcomp 
(70) 
Jpegcomp 
(90) 
Fig. 14 Samples of various
attacked images
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Table 7 Face recognition rate comparison for Model 1, Model 2 and Model 3 under various attacks
Attack Model 1
(PCA+LSB)
Model 2
(PCA+DCT)
Model 3
(PCA+DWT)
No attack 98.74 98.91 98.79
Median Filter (3 × 3) 95.96 96.24 95.94
Median Filter (5 × 5) 84.87 85.27 84.75
Gaussian Noise (0,0.001) 98.32 98.48 98.66
Gaussian Noise (0,0.002) 97.95 98.62 98.47
Gaussian Noise (0.001,0) 98.74 98.91 98.79
Gaussian Noise (0.005,0) 88.41 90.76 88.72
Gaussian Noise (0.01,0) 19.84 26.49 20.68
Salt&Pepper (0.001) 98.58 98.78 98.68
Salt&Pepper (0.002) 98.37 98.62 98.45
Salt&Pepper (0.005) 97.72 98.03 98.08
Salt&Pepper (0.01) 96.16 96.57 95.78
JPEG compression (10 %) 98.74 98.91 98.79
JPEG compression (30 %) 98.74 98.91 98.79
JPEG compression (50 %) 98.74 98.91 98.79
JPEG compression (70 %) 98.74 98.91 98.79
JPEG compression (90 %) 98.74 98.91 98.79
Table 8 Watermark detection rate comparison for Model 1, Model 2 and Model 3 under various attacks
Attack Model 1
(PCA+LSB)
Model 2
(PCA+DCT)
Model 3
(PCA+DWT)
No attack 0.72 0.97 0.64
Median Filter (3 × 3) 0.71 0.74 0.56
Median Filter (5 × 5) 0.71 0.59 0.56
Gaussian Noise (0,0.001) 0.56 0.69 0.54
Gaussian Noise (0,0.002) 0.56 0.63 0.55
Gaussian Noise (0.001,0) 0.72 0.97 0.51
Gaussian Noise (0.005,0) 0.41 0.95 0.51
Gaussian Noise (0.01,0) 0.42 0.97 0.51
Salt&Pepper (0.001) 0.72 0.94 0.57
Salt&Pepper (0.002) 0.72 0.89 0.54
Salt&Pepper (0.005) 0.72 0.80 0.51
Salt&Pepper (0.01) 0.72 0.69 0.51
JPEG compression (10 %) 0.72 0.55 0.56
JPEG compression (30 %) 0.72 0.61 0.55
JPEG compression (50 %) 0.72 0.70 0.54
JPEG compression (70 %) 0.72 0.79 0.55
JPEG compression (90 %) 0.72 0.95 0.54
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In the initial part of the experiment, the three models are evaluated based on face
recognition accuracy as well as watermark robustness against signal processing attacks,
essentially by adding noises, some effects of which are illustrated Fig. 14.
The face recognition rate is measured using the PCA algorithm to investigate the effect of
the watermarking. The correlation factor, as given by the following equation [30], is computed
to measure the similarity between the embedded watermark denotes as w and w^ is the extracted
watermark for watermark detection.
ρ wð ; w^

¼
X N
i¼1 wi bwiﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃX N
i¼1w
2
i
r ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃX N
i¼1w^
2
i
r ! ð4Þ
6.6.1 Experiment A – face recognition rate
The experiment results are given in Table 7, which shows the face recognition verification
accuracy rate of the three models when exposed to the various noise attacks. The results show
that all the models produce high recognition rates with little difference amongst them under
normal circumstances when no attacks are taking place. Nonetheless, Model 2 (PCA-DCT)
still has the best recognition rate at 98.91 %.
When under attack, the results show that the recognition rate slightly decreases for all the
models except for under the Gaussian Noise (0.01.0) attack, where all the recognition rates
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Fig. 15 Face recognition rate comparison with methods of Model 1, Model 2 and Model 3 under various attacks
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Fig. 16 Watermark detection rate comparison with methods of Model 1, Model 2 and Model 3 under various
attacks
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drop tremendously. This is obviously because the face image cannot be recognized anymore as
the attack is simply too heavy and has destroyed the image. In the rest of the table, it can be
seen that, overall, Model 2 has better results when compared with the two models.
6.6.2 Experiment B - watermark detection (Robustness)
In this part of the experiment, the robustness of the three models is measured to find out the
immunity of the watermark against attempts to remove or degrade unintentionally, with the
same types of digital processing attacks. Table 8 gives the results, showing clearly that Model
2 outperforms the other models. [Note also here that the detection rate of 0.75 and above is
considered acceptable, as the watermark can still be fully recovered [2].]
The results from Tables 7 and 8 can be re-represented as in the following Figs. 15 and 16
for a better presentation to compare the performance of the three models.
The results from the above show that the PCA-DCT combination (Model 2) is the best
combination amongst the three for the watermarked face recognition scheme, showing both
high recognition and watermark detection rates as well as robustness against various attacks.
Experiment 1 is for the main objective, experiment 2 is towards non-degradation, supported
by experiment 5, as the claim also includes a proposal for a secure face recognition and
watermarking combination. Experiment 3 is a pre-requisite for all the other experiments, while
experiment 4 is for computing robustness of the watermarked face recognition scheme.
7 Conclusion
This paper has presented a proposal for a watermarked face recognition scheme with a
suitable and viable combination of a face recognition system and a watermarking system,
namely a PCA—DCT system that will ensure the authenticity of the data being transmit-
ted in the face recognition system, which will then increase its level of security. The
contributions from this research constitute a meaningful solution step to the security
problems associated with biometric techniques and to the area of digital image processing.
In addition, it is hoped that the outcome of this research will stimulate further research by
opening up more research gaps in the area of combining biometric and watermarking
techniques.
The PCA-DCT combination is shown not to degrade the performance of the individual
systems, and the proposed watermarked face recognition scheme will ensure the authenticity
of the data being transmitted in the face recognition system at the 8 vulnerable positions where
data may be intercepted and/or reinserted. Moreover, the watermarking scheme is shown to be
robust against signal processing attacks, and in particular the watermark cannot be easily
removed by an attacker.
Within the proposed watermarked face recognition scheme, a logo and a timestamp are
embedded as watermarks. The logo serves as an authentication item if the face image is stolen,
while the timestamp works as a session ID, which is the main security enhancer. When a face
image or feature set is stolen from within the process and then reinserted back to the system, it
will be immediately recognised as coming from a different session and will be rejected.
With positions a and h (in Fig. 1) being not within the scope of this research, and that
positions e, f,g, h being not relevant for reinsertions, the remaining 7 × 4 = 28 situations have
been found to be fully secured. This means that within the 8 × 8 = 64 total vulnerable positions:
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– 7 × 4 = 28 are fully covered with this proposal
– 8 × 4 = 32 are irrelevant
– 2 × 2 = 4 are left for future work
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